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NOTES AND COMMENTS
cause, contrary to the findings of the Nevada court, North Carolina finds
that no bona fide domicile was acquired in Nevada." ' .*
ARTHUR C. JONES, JR.
Federal Venue-Plaintiff Denied Option to Sue in His Home
District Where Federal jurisdiction not Founded Solely
on Diversity of Citizenship
The general federal venue statute reads: "... no civil suit shall
be brought in any district court against any person by any original proc-
ess or proceeding in any other district than that whereof he is an
inhabitant; but where the jurisdiction is founded only on the fact that
the action is between citizens of different States, suit shall be brought
only in the district of the residence of either the plaintiff pr the
defendant."' * A recent case has reiterated the well established judicial
emphasis placed on the word "only" in the statute. Suit was instittited
in federal court in the district of the residence of the plaintiffs and both
diversity of citizenship and the presence of a federal question were set
up as grounds for federal jurisdiction. Held: Since the federal judis-
diction was not founded solely on diversity of citizenship each defend-
ant was entitled to be sued in the district of which he was an inhabi-
tant. On apt motion by the defendants the suit was dismissed.2
Federal venue is not the same thing as federal jurisdiction. Venue
has to do with the geographical situs of the suit,--with which par-
ticular federal court shall hear the case; jurisdiction concerns the sub-
stantive power of any federal court to take cognizance of the suit.
Even if jurisdiction is established the venue must still be properly laid.
"1* In that event the Court will face these facts: first, that when the courts
of divorce mill states find that divorce seeking transients are residents having
no fixed intention to depart after the divorce is obtained, these courts are guilty
of falsehood; second, the motive for the falsehood is to obtain the divorce busi-
ness; third, if courts of other states are required by the Supreme Court to accept
such a finding, then they are being required to recognize that their own citizens
were domiciled where those citizens were not domiciled; fourth, the divorce mill
states, if other states must recognize their product, are enabled to fix the divorce
law for every state in the union as to those citizens having the price of a trip
to the divorce mill states; fifth, whatever we may think should be the solution
of the difficult and vital divorce problem, it would be hard to conceive of a worse
method of solving it than to have the law fixed for the whole country by a few
states framing their law with the motive of making profit from severing mar-
riages.--Ed.
1*18 STAT. 470 (1875), 24 STAT. 552 (1887), 25 STAT. 433 (1888), 28 U. S.
C. A. §112 (1927) (judicial Code §51). Italics supplied. The statute formerly
read: "And no civil suit shall be brought before either of said courts [circuit
or district] against any person by any original process or proceeding in any
other district than that whereof he is an inhabitant, or in which he shall be
found at the time of serving such process or commencing such proceeding...."
18 STAT. 470 (1875). Hollingsworth v. Adams, 12 Fed. Gas. 348, No. 6,611 (C.
C. D. Penn. 1798).2 Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Slaff, 131 F. (2d) 148 (C. C. A. 5th, 1942).
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Unlike jurisdiction, proper venue may be created by consent. The right
to be sued in a particular district is a personal privilege which may be
waived,8 and, in fact, it is so waived unless the question is actively
and promptly raised.4 It is now held that when a corporation estab-
lishes a process agent in another state it thereby consents to be sued
there and waives any objection to the venue of federal courts in that
state.5*
The statute involved in the instant case is a general act applying
to all federal civil suits for which no special venue specifications have
been provided.d. It does not apply to suits against aliens because the
alien is a citizen of no particular state.7 Hence, he can be sued
3 Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U. S. 165, 60 S. Ct. 153,
84 L. ed. 167 (1939), 128 A. L. R. 1437, 1447 (1940) ; Western Loan & Savings
Co. v. Butte & Boston Consolidated Mining Co., 210 U. S. 368, 28 S. Ct. 720, 52
L. ed. 1101 (1908); Matter of Moore, 209 U. S. 490, 28 S. Ct. 585, 52 L. ed.
904 (1908); Interior Construction & Improvement Co. v. Gibney, 160 U. S. 217,
16 S. Ct. 272, 40 L. ed. 401 (1895); Central Trust Co. v. McGeorge, 151 U. S.
129, 14 S. Ct. 286, 38 L. ed. 98 (1894); Graver Tank & Mfg. Corp. v. New
England Terminal Co., 125 F. (2d) 71 (C. C. A. 1st, 1942); Wabash Ry. v.
Bridal, 94 F. (2d) 117 (C. C. A. 8th, 1938). Contra: O'Neil v. Co-Operative
League of America, 278 Fed. 737 (M. D. Penn. 1922).
'Western Loan & Savings Co. v. Butte & Boston Consolidated Mining Co.,
210 U. S. 368, 28 S. Ct. 720? 52 L. ed. 1101 (1908); Interior Construction &
Improvement Co. v. Gibney, 160 U. S. 217, 16 S. Ct. 272, 40 L. ed. 401 (1895) ;
Graver Tank & Mfg. Corp. v. New -England Terminal Co., 125 F. (2d) 71
(C. C. A. 1st, 1942); Wabash Ry. v. Bridal, 94 F. (2d) 117 (C. C. A. 8th,
1938). Contra: O'Neil v. Co-Operative League of America, 278 Fed. 737 (M.
D. Penn. 1922).
*Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U. S. 165, 60 S. Ct. 153,
84 L. ed. 167 (1939), 128 A. L. R. 1437, 1447 (1940) ; Note (1940) 18 N. C. L.
REv. 232. Since a corporation is "found" wherever it has established a process
agent, and since the establishment of a process agent waives venue objections,
this case in effect reenacts the prior venue statute of 1875 insofar as corporations
are concerned. See note 1 supra. Compare Ex parte Schollenberger, 96 U. S.
369, 24 L. ed. 853 (1878), with United States v. Southern P. R. R., 49 Fed.
297 (N. D. Calif. 1892). This effect would be limited where the statute under
which the process agent is established specifies that the agent is to be provided
in order to accept process in certain types of suits. In such case the corporation
does not agree to submit itself to any different suits and only waives its federal
venue objection as to suits mentioned in the process agent statute. North Butte
Mining Co. v. Tripp, 128 F. (2d) 588 (C. C. A. 9th 1942) (suit on cause of
action arising outside the state). In North Carolina the local process agent
statute requires every corporation having property or doing business within the
state to provide an agent upon whom process in "all actions or proceedings against
it" can be served. N. C. CoDE Al z. (Michie, 1939) §1137. However, the service
of summons statute provides that service of summons can be had on a foreign
corporation only "when it has property, or the cause of action arose, or the
plaintiff resides, in this state, or when it can be made personally within the state
upon the president, treasurer or secretary thereof." N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie,
1939) §483.
O* Such as suits in states containing more than one district where different
defendants are citizens of the same state but reside in different districts, or where
property lies in different districts in the same state. 28 U. S. C. A. §§113-116
(1927). Suits under special statutes such as the patent acts or the Federal Em-
ployer's Liability Act, etc.
7Ri Hohorst, 150 U. S. 653, 14 S. Ct. 221, 37 L. ed. 1211 (1893); Vestal v.
Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co., 210 Fed. 375 (E. D. Tenn. 1911); See
Automotive Equipment, Inc. v. Trico Products Corp., 10 F. Supp. 736, 739 (S. D.
N. Y. 1935). Contra: Meyer v. Herrera, 41 Fed. 65 (W. D. Tex. 1889).
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wherever valid service of process can be obtained. But where the alien
is plaintiff the statute is applied to require suit in the district of the
residence of the citizen defendants* It has no application to suits
removed from state to federal courts.9 In such case the theory is either
that the statute does not apply because the suit is not in federal court by
"original process or proceeding," or that plaintiff, by instituting the
suit in the state court in that district, waives any objection to venue
and that defendant by his petition for removal also waives any objec-
tions he might have.
The interpretation of the statute as applied in the instant case is
well established by a long line of decisions.1 0 Most of them have con-
",Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. v. Gonzales, 151 U. S. 496, 14 S. Ct. 401, 38
L. ed. 248 (1894); Fribourg v. Pullman Co., 176 Fed. 981 (E. D. N. C. 1910).
But where removal is involved compare Keating v. Pennsylvania Co., 245 Fed.
155 (N. D. Ohio 1917); Barlow v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., 172 Fed. 513 (N. D.
Iowa 1909) ; and note 9 infra, with Hall v. Great Northern Ry., 197 Fed. 488
(D. Mont. 1912). Similarly suits by the United States must be brought in the
district of which defendant is an inhabitant. Davidson Bros. Marble Co. v.
United States ex rel Gibson, 213 U. S. 10, 29 S. Ct. 324, 53 L. ed. 675 (1909)
United States v. Southern P. R. R., 49 Fed. 297 (N. D. Calif. 1892).
" Great Northern Ry. v. Galbreath Cattle Co., 271 U. S. 99, 46 S. Ct. 439, 70
L. ed. 854 (1926); Lee v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 260 U. S. 653, 43 S. Ct. 230, 67
L. ed. 443 (1923); Matter of Moore, 209 U. S. 490, 28 S. Ct. 585, 52 L. ed.
904 (1908); United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Board of Comm'rs of
Woodson County, Kans., 145 Fed. 144 (C. C. A. 8th, 1906); Sterrett v. Hydro-
United Tire Corp., 32 F. (2d) 823 (E. D. Penn. 1929) ; Keating v. Pennsylvania
Co., 245 Fed. 155 (N. D. Ohio 1917); Waterman v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 199
Fed. 667 (D. N. J. 1912); Hubbard v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 176 Fed. 994
(C. C. D. Minn. 1910); Barlow v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., 172 Fed. 513 (N. D.
Iowa 1909) ; Burch v. Southern Pacific Co., 139 Fed. 350 (C. C. D. Nev. 1905) ;
Empire Min. Co. v. Propeller Tow-Boat Co. of Savannah, 108 Fed. 900 (C. C.
D. S. C. 1901); Whitworth v. Illinois Central R. R., 107 Fed. 557 (C. C. D.
Ky. 1901); Cooley v. McArthur, 35 Fed. 372 (E. D. Mich. 1888); Robinson v.
Attapulgus Clay Co., 55 Ga. App. 141, 189 S. E. 555 (1937); see General In-
vestment Co. v. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry., 260 U. S. 261, 270, 43 S. Ct. 106, 111,
67 L. ed. 244, 253 (1922). Contra: Hall v. Great Northern Ry., 197 Fed. 488
(D, Mont. 1912); County of Yuba v. Pioneer Gold Mining Co., 32 Fed. 183
(C. C. N. D. Calif. 1887), overruled Wilson v. Western Union Tel. Co., 34 Fed.
561 (C. C. N. D. Calif. 1888).
'o Male v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 240 U. S. 97, 36 S. Ct. 351, 60 L. ed.
544 (1916) ; Macon Grocery Co. v. Atlantic C. L. R. R., 215 U. S. 501, 30 S. Ct.
184, 54 L. ed. 300 (1910); Wilhelm v. Consolidated Oil Corp., 84 F. (2d) 739
(C. C. A. 10th, 1936) ; Webster Co. v. Society for Visual Education, 83 F. (2d)
47 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936); Sutherland v. United States, 74 F. (2d) 89 (C. C. A.
8th, 1934); Southern Pacific Co. v. Arlington Heights Fruit Co., 191 Fed. 101
(C. C. A. 9th, 1911); Lewis v. United Air Lines Transpqrt Corp., 29 F. Supp.
112 (D. Conn. 1939); Bacon v. Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, 289
Fed. 513 (E. D. Wash. 1923); Railroad Comm'rs of Florida v. Burleson, 255
Fed. 604 (N. D. Fla. 1919); City of Memphis v. Board of Directors of St.
Francis Levee Dist., 228 Fed. 802 (W. D. Tenn. 1916); Rubber & Celluloid
Harness Trimming Co., v. John L. Whiting-J. J. Adams Co., 210 Fed. 393
(D. Mass. 1913) (removal); Newell v. Baltimore & 0. R. R., 181 Fed. 698
(C. C. W. D. Penn. 1910); Whittaker v. Illinois Central R. R., 176 Fed. 130
(C. C. E. D. La. 1910); Smith v. Detroit & T. S. L. Ry., 175 Fed. 506 (C. C.
N. D. Ohio 1909); Cound v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 173 Fed. 527 (C. C. W.
D. Tex. 1909); Sunderland Bros. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 158 Fed. 877
(C. C. D. Neb. 1908); see Re Keasbey & Mattison Co., 160 U. S. 221, 228, 16
S. Ct. 273, 275, 40 L. ed. 402, 405 (1895) ; McCormick Harvesting Machine Co.
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cerned the combination of diversity of citizenship with the presence of a
federal question as basis for the federal jurisdiction." 1 At least one
action was dismissed for improper venue where the suit was brought in
the district of the residence of the plaintiff but the ancillary jurisdiction
of the federal courts was added to diversity of citizenship as a ground
for federal jurisdiction.' 2 The statute clearly says "only," and uni-
formly the courts have construed this word to mean "solely" or "ex-
clusively," thus denying the plaintiff any option to sue in federal court
in his own district when the federal jurisdiction is founded on any
other ground in addition to diversity of citizenship. Such a construction
of the word seems reasonable enough at first glance and Mr. Justice
Harlan, in a dissent in the leading case of Macon Grocery Co. v.
Atlantic Coast Line R. R., raised the only protest against the absurdities
inherent in the operation of such law. 8
The Macon Grocery case involved the typical situation in which
federal jurisdiction was invoked on two grounds,-diversity of citizen-
ship and presence of a federal question. Now, it is clear from the
statute that where the sole ground of federal jurisdiction is diversity of
citizenship the plaintiff has a right to bring the suit in the federal
court of his own district.' 4 (Provided always, of course, that he can
v. Walthers, 134 U. S. 41, 43, 10 S. Ct. 485, 486, 33 L. ed. 833 834 (1890); Goff
Co. v. Lamborn & Co., 281 Fed. 613, 616 (C. C. A. 5th, 19225 ; Trapp v. Balti-
more & 0. R. R., 283 Fed. 655 (N. D. Ohio 1922); Wogan Bros. v. American
Sugar Refining Co., 215 Fed. 273, 274 (E. D. La. 1914); A. L. Wolff & Co. v.
Choctaw, 0. & G. R. R., 133 Fed. 601, 602 (E. D. Ark. 1904).
" Male v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 240 U. S. 97, 36 S. Ct. 351, 60 L. ed.
544 (1916); Macon Grocery Co. v. Atlantic C. L. R. R., 215 U. S. 501, 30 S.
Ct. 184, 54 L. ed. 300 (1910); Wilhelm v. Consolidated Oil Corp., 84 F. (2d)
739 (C. C. A. 10th, 1936); Webster Co. v. Society for Visual Education, 83 F.
(2d) 47 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936); Sutherland v. United States, 74 F. (2d) 89
(C. C. A. 8th, 1934) (partnership defendant) ; Southern Pacific Co. v. Arlington
Heights Fruit Co., 191 Fed. 101 (C. C. A. 9th, 1911); Bacon v. Federal Reserve
Bank of San Francisco, 289 Fed. 513 (E. D. Wash. 1923); Railroad Comm'rs
of Florida v. Burleson, 255 Fed. 604 (N. D. Fla. 1919); City of Memphis v.
Board of Directors of St. Francis Levee Dist., 228 Fed. 802 (W. D. Tenn. 1916) ;
Rubber & Celluloid Harness Trimming Co. v. John L. Whiting-J. J. Adams
Co., 210 Fed. 393 (D. Mass. 1913); Newell v. Baltimore & 0. R. R., 181 Fed.
698 (C. C. W. D. Penn. 1910); Whittaker v. Illinois Central R. R., 176 Fed. 130
(C. C. E. D. La. 1910); Smith v. Detroit & T. S. L. Ry., 175 Fed. 506 (C. C. N.
D. Ohio 1909); Cound v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 173 Fed. 527 (C. C. W. D.
Tex. 1909); Sunderland Bros. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 158 Fed. 877 (C. C.
D. Neb. 1908).
" Lewis v. United Air Lines Transport Corp., 29 F. Supp. 112 (D. Conn.
1939).
"3 Macon Grocery Co. v. Atlantic C. L. R. R., 215 U. S. 501, 511, 30 S. Ct.
184, 188, 54 L. ed. 300, 305 (1910) (dissenting opinion).
"McCormick Harvesting Machine Co. v. Walthers, 134 U. S. 41, 10 S. Ct.
485, 33 L. ed. 833 (1890); Tate v. Baugh, 252 Fed. 317 (W. D. Tenn. 1918);
Evansville Courier Co. v. United Press, 74 Fed. 918 (C. C. D. Ind. 1896); Bost-
wick v. American Finance Co., 43 Fed. 897 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1890); Pitkin
County Min. Co. v. Markell, 33 Fed. 386 (C. C. D. Col. 1887) (removal); St.
Louis, V. & T. H. R.R. v. Terre Haute & I. R. R., 33 Fed. 385 (C. C. S. D.
Ill. 1887) (removal); Fales v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 32 Fed. 673 (C. C. N.
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there obtain valid service of process on the defendant.) 15 It is equally
clear that whether or not diversity of citizenship is the sole ground
of jurisdiction the plaintiff cannot, over seasonable objection by the
defendant, place his suit in a district where neither the plaintiff nor the
defendant resides.' 8 Obviously, cases of this latter type do not require
a holding that another ground for jurisdiction in addition to diversity
of citizenship will rob plaintiff of any option to sue in his own district
and necessitate suit in the district of the defendant's residence, and any
statement or implication to that effect would be pure dicta. Neverthe-
less, the majority in the Macon Grocery case relied heavily on such
precedents to reach their conclusion that the presence of any foundation
for jurisdiction other than diversity of citizenship would necessitate
dismissal of suits brought in the district of the residence of the plain-
tiff. This faulty application of stare decisis is ably pointed out by Mr.
Justice Harlan. He also finds it passing strange that the plaintiff
should lose his option to sue in his home district merely because he is
fortunate enough to possess another ground for invoking federal
jurisdiction in addition to his diversity of citizenship.l?*
Consider the effect in the instant case. The plaintiffs cannot rid
their suit of the federal question because the court will take judicial
cognizance (when brought to its attention by defendant's objection)
of any federal laws involved regardless of whether or not they are
pleaded.' 8 Plaintiffs are citizens of Mississippi; two of the defendants
D. Iowa 1887) (removal). Contra: County of Yuba v. Pioneer Gold Mining
Co., 32 Fed. 183 (C. C. N. D. Calif. 1887), overruled Wilson v. Western Union
Tel. Co., 34 Fed. 561 (C. C. N. D. Calif. 1888).
'5 American Indemnity Co. v. Detroit Fidelity & Surety Co., 63 F. (2d)
395 (C. C. A. 5th, 1933); Koncewicz v. East Liverpool City Hospital, 31 F. Supp.
122 (W. D. Penn. 1940); Gutschalk v. Peck, 261 Fed. 212 (N. D. Ohio 1919).
1 Luckett v. Delpark, 270 U. S. 496, 46 S. Ct. 397, 70 L. ed. 703 (1926);
Seaboard Rice Milling Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 270 U. S. 363, 46 S. Ct.
247, 70 L. ed. 633 (1926) ; Camp v. Gress, 250 U. S. 308, 39 S. Ct. 478, 63 L ed.
997 (1919) ; Ladew v. Tennessee Copper Co., 218 U. S. 357, 31 S. Ct. 81, 54 L. ed.
1096 (1910); Re Keasbey & Mattison Co., 160 U. S. 221, 16 S. Ct. 273, 40
L. ed. 402 (1895); Southern Pacific Co. v. Denton, 146 U. S. 202, 13 S. Ct. 44,
36 L. ed. 942 (1892) ; .Ex Parte Shaw, 145 U. S. 444, 12 S. Ct. 935, 36 L. ed.
768 (1892); Findlay v. Florida E. C. Ry., 68 F. (2d) 541 (C. C. A. 5th, 1934);
Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v: Tompkins, 101 Fed. 539 (C. C. A. 4th, 1900);
Ware-Kramer Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 178 Fed. 117 (C. C. E.
D. N. C. 1910); Schultz v. Highland Gold Mines Co., 158 Fed. 337 (C. C. D.
Ore. 1907); Tice v. Hurley, 145 Fed. 391 (C. C. W. D. Ky. 1906); A. L.
Wolff & Co. v. Choctaw, 0. & G. R. R., 133 Fed. 601 (C. C. E. -D. Ark. 1904) ;
Bensinger Self-Adding Cash Register Co. v. National Cash Register Co 42
Fed. 81 (C. C. E. D. Mo. 1890). But cf. Rowitzer v. Wyatt, 40 Fed. 609 (C. C. S.
D. Calif. 1889) (partnership).
I'* See note 13 supra. His further argument that the decision of the majority
would destroy the right to remove is now nullified by subsequent holdings to the
effect that the venue statue places no restrictions on removals. See note 9 supra.
"Whittaker v. Illinois Central R. R., 176 Fed. 130 (E. D. La. 1910); Cound
v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 173 Fed. 52 (C. C. W. D. Tex. 1909); Sunderland
Bros. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 158 Fed. 877 (C. C. D. Neb. 1908) ; accord,
Male v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 240 U. S. 97, 36 S. Ct 351, 60 L. ed. 544 (1916) ;
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are alleged to be, citizens of Washington, D. C. and two are citizens
of Maryland. To obtain complete federal adjudication of their rights
plaintiffs must sue each defendant in the district of which he is an
inhabitant. Thus plaintiffs must incur the expense of at least two dis-
tant suits-one in Washington and one in Maryland. The Washington
defendants could not be sued in Maryland over their objection; the
Maryland defendants could not be sued in Washington. 19* Also, all
of the defendants might very easily be indispensable parties. In such
event, if they continued their refusal to waive venue, suits brought in
either Washington or Maryland would be dismissed because of the
absence of the indispensable defendants.20 Thus, the plaintiffs would
be completely barred from all access to the federal courts merely because
they were so unfortunate as to possess two perfectly good grounds for
substantive federal jurisdiction instead of only one.
An amendment to the statute striking out the objectionable word
"only" and allowing plaintiffs to sue in their own districts whenever
diversity of citizenship is shown would greatly clarify the situation.
JoHN T. KILPATRICK, JR.
Negligence-Res Ipsa Loquitur-Application to
Unexplained Automobile Accident
The Supreme Court of North Carolina recently applied the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur in a civil action for personal injuries arising out
of an unexplained automobile accident. That doctrine is often stated
as follows: "There must be reasonable evidence of negligence; but
where the thing is shown to be under the management of the defendant
or his servants, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of
things does not happen if those who have the management use proper
care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by
Rubber & Celluloid Harness Trimming Co. v. John L. Whiting-J. J. Adams
Co., 210 Fed. 393 (D. Mass. 1913); Smith v. Detroit & T. S. L. R. R., 175
Fed. 506 (C. C. N. D. Ohio 1909); cf. Wilhelm v. Consolidated Oil Corp., 84
F. (2d) 739 (C. C. A. 10th, 1936); Newell v. Baltimore & 0. R. R., 181 Fed. 698
(C. C. W. D. Penn. 1910).IQ* Camp v. Gress, 250 U. S. 308, 39 S. Ct. 478, 63 L. ed. 997 (1919) ; Findlay
v. Florida E. C. Ry., 68 F. (2d) 541 (C. C. A. 5th, 1934); Ware-Kramer To-
bacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 178 Fed. 117 (C. C. E. D. N. C. 1910);
Schultz v. Highland Gold Mines Co., 158 Fed. 337 (C. C. D. Ore. 1907); Tice
v. Hurley, 145 Fed. 391 (C. C. W. D. Ky. 1906); Bensinger Self-Adding Cash
Register Co. v. National Cash Register Co., 42 Fed. 81 (C. C. E. D. Mo. 1890).
Contra: Rawitzer v. Wyatt, 40 Fed. 609 (C. C. S. D. Calif. 1889) (partnership).
Conversely, where there is diversity of citizenship a suit brought in the district of
the residence of a plaintiff may be dismissed as to any other non-resident plain-
tiffs because as to them the venue is not laid in either the district of the residence
of the plaintiff or the defendant. Smith v. Lyon, 133 U. S. 315, 10 S. Ct. 303, 33
L. ed. 635 (1890).
2' Findlay v. Florida E. C. Ry., 68 F. (2d) 541 (C. C. A. 5th, 1934); see
Camp v. Gress, 250 U. S. 308, 316, 39 S. Ct. 478, 481, 63 L. ed. 997, 1003 (1919).
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